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COMMENTS 
COERCED FATE: HOW NEGOTIATION 
MODELS LEAD TO FALSE CONFESSIONS 
KIERA JANZEN* 
Police interrogators across the United States employ tactics that can 
lead to coerced, often false, confessions.  While police departments have 
shifted away from physically coercive methods of interrogation, 
psychologically coercive practices that utilize deceit have taken their place.  
The reliability of confession evidence becomes a significant concern when 
interrogators elicit confessions using these techniques.  Further 
demonstrating the need for change in this realm, false confessions and 
wrongful convictions place a financial burden on cities and taxpayers, who 
foot the bill for settlements and damages resulting from these cases.  The 
current legal framework in the U.S. permits—by failing to explicitly 
prohibit—these tactics, and police departments across the nation implement 
and encourage officers to use them.  The psychologically coercive methods 
that police employ in interrogations share elements with methods that 
parties often use in negotiations.  To analyze why interrogators engage in 
these practices and why they are successful in eliciting confessions, this 
Comment examines psychologically coerced confessions under the 
frameworks of three commonly used negotiation models: 1) the position-
based model, 2) the interest-based model, and 3) the core concerns model.  
This analysis illustrates the need for systemic change to the laws applicable 
to police interrogations, the widely used methods of interrogation, and the 
inter-departmental practices that perpetuate coercive tactics.  Specifically, 
this Comment suggests a cross-institutional approach to reform in which 
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lawmakers enact legislation that sets standards for interrogations, judges 
prohibit evidence elicited through psychologically coercive tactics, and 
police departments overhaul their interrogation practices and hold officers 
accountable when they engage in psychologically coercive techniques. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Patterns tell you that you have a bad orchard, not just a bad apple.”1 
On November 30, 2008, a sixteen-year-old mother hysterically placed 
a call to the police department in Worcester, Massachusetts to report that 
her thirteen-month-old son, who suffered from respiratory problems, was 
 
 1 Sarah Macaraeg & Yana Kunichoff, ‘Nothing Happens to the Police’: Forced 
Confessions Go Unpunished in Chicago, GUARDIAN (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.theguard
ian.com/us-news/2016/jan/28/chicago-police-department-false-confessions-torture 
[https://perma.cc/EU9H-88U7]. 
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not breathing.2  Nga Truong’s baby died at a nearby hospital less than 
ninety minutes later.3 About twenty-four hours later, Truong confessed to 
suffocating her infant son, Khyle, after Worcester police detectives 
interrogated her for two hours.4  Following the confession, police arrested 
Truong and charged her with murder as an adult.5  A judge denied Truong 
bail and the right to attend Khyle’s funeral, then sent her to jail where she 
spent the first four months on suicide watch and in solitary confinement.6 
Without a trial, this period of detainment occurred while Truong was 
supposed to be presumed innocent.7 
A videotape of the interrogation shows Truong in an eight-by-ten foot 
windowless interrogation room, repeatedly denying killing her son and 
fighting back tears.8  Over the course of the two-hour interrogation, the 
teenage mother stated thirteen times that she did not kill Khyle.9  However, 
Sergeant Kevin Pageau and Detective John Doherty’s utilization of 
interrogation elements from the commonly used Reid Technique—a multi-
part method of questioning designed to psychologically coerce subjects—
eventually led Truong to falsely confess.10 
 
 2 David Boeri, How a Teen’s Coerced Confession Set Her Free, NPR (Dec. 30, 2011, 
3:22 PM), https://www.npr.org/2012/01/02/144489360/how-a-teens-coerced-confession-set-
her-free [https://perma.cc/TND2-DZES]. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Gretchen Gavett, A Rare Look at the Police Tactics That Can Lead to False 
Confessions, PBS (Dec. 9, 2011), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/a-rare-look-at-
the-police-tactics-that-can-lead-to-false-confessions/ [https://perma.cc/E2VM-LLVD]. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Boeri, supra note 2; Brian Ballou et al., Teen Charged in Son’s Death Found Infant 
Brother Dead, BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 3, 2008), http://archive.boston.com/news/local/massach
usetts/articles/2008/12/03/teen_charged_in_sons_death_found_infant_brother_dead/ 
[https://perma.cc/B424-VM9V]. 
 7 Boeri, supra note 2; see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 724 (1976) (“In the criminal 
justice system, this interest [in notice and an opportunity to be heard] is given concrete 
protection through the presumption of innocence and the prohibition of state-imposed 
punishment unless the State can demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt, at a public trial 
with the attendant constitutional safeguards, that a particular individual has engaged in 
proscribed criminal conduct.”). 
 8 Gavett, supra note 4. 
 9 David Boeri, Anatomy of a Bad Confession, Part 1, WBUR (Dec. 7, 2011), 
http://legacy.wbur.org/2011/12/07/worcester-coerced-confession-i [https://perma.cc/DN5W-
FEFY]. 
 10 Gavett, supra note 4; Boeri states as follows: 
Towards the end of the interrogation, Pageau said, “All everyone’s waiting for 
today is for you to admit to what you did so that we can start the process of getting 
you some help, getting your brothers out of that house, and getting them in a better 
home, where there’s a mom that gets up in the morning and takes care of them.” 
Truong responded by inquiring further about what kind of help she could get, and 
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Nearly three years later in 2011, the prosecutor dropped the case 
against Truong, and she was released after spending two years and six 
months in jail.11  Before the prosecutor dropped the charges, Worcester 
Superior Court Judge Janet Kenton-Walker approved a motion to suppress 
all statements that Truong made to the detectives over the course of her 
interrogation.12  Further, in February 2011, the judge ruled that the 
confession was inadmissible.13  Judge Kenton-Walker described Truong as 
“a frightened, meek, emotionally compromised teenager who never 
understood the implications of her statements.”14  Ultimately, she deemed 
the girl’s statements involuntary for two reasons: the interrogators violated 
procedure by failing to extend her the Miranda rights required for juveniles, 
and they used false statements and deception to illicit the confession.15  The 
prosecutor had no other evidence against Truong—no DNA evidence, no 
eyewitness testimony, no prior convictions, and no circumstantial 
evidence—and was forced to drop the case.16  In 2016, the City of 
Worcester reached a settlement with Truong for $2.1 million, which ended 
her suit against the city for civil rights violations, malicious prosecution, 
false arrest, and false imprisonment.17 
Judge Kenton-Walker found Truong’s statements to be involuntary 
because Pageau and Doherty’s collective use of deceit, false statements, 
false promises, and trickery coerced Truong to falsely confess.18  However, 
almost all of the individual techniques that the interrogators employed were 
 
the officers told her that while they could not promise anything, her confession 
would grant her leniency in the juvenile system. To this, Truong whispered, “Do I 
have to say it?”, and after Pageau replied that she did, Truong sobbed for one full 
minute before stating, “I smothered Khyle.” 
Boeri, supra note 9. 
 11 Boeri, supra note 2; Gavett, supra note 4. 
 12 Gavett, supra note 4. 
 13 Boeri, supra note 2. 
 14 Id; see also David Boeri, Woman in Tossed-Out Confession Gets $2.1M Settlement 
from Worcester, WBUR (June 30, 2016), http://www.wbur.org/all-things-
considered/2016/06/30/nga-truong-worcester-settlement [https://perma.cc/U4CM-WCYT] 
(noting that after Judge Kenton-Walker watched the interrogation video, she stated, “With 
notable naivete, Nga believed what the officers told her. . . . All she wanted to know was 
whether she and her brothers would now be able to go to a foster home.”). 
 15 Boeri, supra note 2. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Boeri, supra note 14. 
 18 Boeri, supra note 2; Gavett, supra note 4. 
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legal.19  Interrogations are inherently stressful and coercive by nature 
because authority figures use both intimidation and leverage.20  Police 
departments no longer engage in the brutal physical torture tactics, often 
referred to as “the third degree,” that were commonplace prior to the 
Supreme Court’s 1936 prohibition on such methods in Brown v. 
Mississippi.21  However, the current U.S. legal framework permits many 
psychologically coercive techniques that police interrogators employ.22 
Interrogators design and employ psychologically coercive tactics to 
elicit confessions in a manner similar to formerly used physical torture 
techniques.  One definition of psychologically coercive police tactics is 
“coercive police methods that sequentially manipulate a suspect’s 
perception of the situation, expectations for the future, and motivation to 
shift from denial to admission.”23  These tactics can result in truthful 
confessions and the genuine administration of justice, but numerous cases 
demonstrate that they frequently lead to false confessions and wrongful 
convictions of innocent individuals who were psychologically coerced to 
profess guilt to crimes that they did not commit.24 
The psychologically coercive tactics used by interrogators like Pageau 
and Doherty, and the confessions they produce, raise the issue of reliability 
throughout the legal process, from interrogation to potential conviction.25  
Most jurors cannot fathom confessing to a crime that they did not commit.26  
People unfamiliar with interrogation tactics struggle to imagine why 
 
 19 Boeri, supra note 2. Note that Judge Kenton-Walker did not rule on the permissibility 
of any of the individual tactics that Pageau and Doherty used, but found that their collective 
use of these techniques throughout Truong’s interrogation coerced her to confess. 
 20 Frances E. Chapman, Coerced Internalized False Confessions and Police 
Interrogations: The Power of Coercion, 37 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 159, 164 (2013). 
 21 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Boeri, supra note 9; but see, e.g., 
Macaraeg & Kunichoff, supra note 1 (discussing the Chicago Police Department’s use of 
electric shock, suffocation, beating, and mock executions to coerce confessions under 
detective and commander Jon Burge from the 1970s through early 1990s). 
 22 Gavett, supra note 4. 
 23 Chapman, supra note 20, at 163–64. 
 24 See Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 
1060 (2010) (noting that scholars and researchers have identified at least 250 cases involving 
false confessions since the 1990s). See also Richard Leo, Police Interrogations, False 
Confessions, and Alleged Child Abuse Cases, 50 U. MICH. J.  L. REFORM 693, 698–700 
(2017) (noting that “DNA cases consistently show fifteen to twenty-five percent false 
confessions”, and that this may just be the “tip of the iceberg” because false confessions are 
“a phenomenon that is largely invisible.”). 
 25 Saul   M.   Kassin,   Why   Confessions   Trump   Innocence,   AM.   PSYCHOLOGIST   
(Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.injusticeinperugia.org/AmericanPsychologistSaulKassin.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C9KQ-KXVB]. 
 26 Id. 
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someone would act against her own interests by admitting guilt when she is 
truly innocent.27  Consequently, people tend to view any confession, 
regardless of its validity, with an underlying presumption of guilt.28 As a 
result, “[t]he real trial is what occurs in the interrogation room.”29  Existing 
laws and their enforcement must shift to prohibit psychologically coercive 
practices that lead to unreliable confessions because such confessions carry 
presuppositions of guilt that impair the administration of justice throughout 
the entirety of a case. 
False confessions not only impair the administration of justice, they 
also cost cities and taxpayers millions of dollars.30  As in Truong’s case, 
courts and juries award millions of dollars in settlements and damages to 
individuals implicated in false confession cases.31  In addition to the pursuit 
of true justice, police departments have financial incentives to change their 
internal interrogation practices to avoid costly payouts for cities and their 
taxpayers. 
The case of Nga Truong is hardly an isolated example of the use of 
psychologically coercive tactics leading to a false confession and wrongful 
conviction.  In the U.S., 40 of the first 250 people exonerated based on 
DNA evidence had falsely confessed.32  The development of DNA testing 
has revealed the scope of the issue of false confessions and wrongful 
 
 27 Richard A. Leo, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Implications, 37 J. 
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW. 332, 333 (2009) (noting that “[M]ost people do not know 
what occurs during police interrogations, and . . . they wrongly assume that individuals do 
not act against their self-interest or engage in self-destructive behavior, such as falsely 
confessing to a crime they did not commit.”). 
 28 Leo, supra note 24, at 700. 
 29 Id. 
 30 See, e.g., Crimesider Staff, How Chicago racked up a $662 million police misconduct 
bill, CBS NEWS (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-chicago-racked-up-a-
662-million-police-misconduct-bill/ [https://perma.cc/U2AZ-9NSD] (noting that from 2004 
to 2016, Chicago taxpayers paid $662 million for police misconduct, largely attributable to 
cases of false confessions and wrongful convictions). 
 31 See, e.g., Fran Spielman, ‘Englewood Four,’ coerced into confessions, to get $31M 
settlement, CHI. SUN TIMES (Dec. 9, 2017), https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/englewood-
four-31-million-settlement-tortured-false-confession-exonerated/ [https://perma.cc/Z7LP-
8YCV] (noting a $31 million settlement to be paid by Chicago taxpayers to four men in a 
rape and murder false confession case); Frank Green, Former U.S. attorney on Norfolk Four 
rape, murder case: ‘It’s the worst miscarriage of justice I’ve experienced in my 40 years as 
a lawyer’, RICHMOND-TIMES DISPATCH (Feb. 23, 2018), http:// www.richmond.com
/news/local/crime/former-u-s-attorney-on-norfolk-four-rape-murder-case/article_fecc026b-
0175-546c-a7f7-7074bc760549.html  [https://perma.cc/D497-7GZ7] (noting a $41 million 
verdict in New York, a $20 million settlement in Illinois, an $18 million settlement in 
Washington, D.C., a $16 million verdict in Missouri, and a $13.2 million verdict in Ohio). 
 32 Garrett, supra note 24. 
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convictions.33  Post-conviction DNA tests prove that many people who 
falsely confessed to crimes could not have been the true perpetrators of 
those crimes.34  In turn, psychologists and social scientists have studied the 
psychological impacts of coercive interrogation tactics in attempts to 
determine how they are applied and why they lead to confessions, whether 
false or not.35 
Although psychologists and social scientists have provided insight into 
how coercive interrogation methods impact interrogation subjects, 
examining psychologically coercive police interrogations under the 
frameworks of several of the most commonly-used negotiation models 
provides further insight into the actions and motivations of both 
interrogation subjects and interrogators.  This Comment analyzes 
psychologically coercive interrogations under the position-based 
negotiation model, the interest-based model,36 and the five core concerns 
presented by Roger Fisher and Daniel Shapiro in their book, Beyond 
Reason: Using Emotions as You Negotiate.37  This analysis clarifies 
common misconceptions surrounding confession evidence by illustrating 
how interrogators get people to confess, why people confess to crimes that 
they did not commit, and what motivates police departments to engage in 
systematic use of these techniques.  This examination further demonstrates 
that the current legal framework applicable to interrogations gives police 
broad leeway to employ tactics that have coercive effects akin to traditional 
physical torture methods.  This legal framework, in combination with lack 
of officer and department accountability and failure to address problematic 
interrogation practices at a systemic level, creates a bad orchard where 
innocent people are psychologically coerced to falsely confess. 
The remainder of this Comment will unfold in several parts.  Part I 
examines the development of the current legal framework that governs 
police interrogations and illustrates how it allows psychologically coercive 
practices to persist.  Part II addresses coercive interrogation tactics and the 
psychological and social science research on coerced confessions, which 
demonstrates how these techniques lead to confessions.  Part III explains 
 
 33 Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and 
Recommendations, 34 L. HUM. BEHAV. (2009), http:// web.williams.edu/ Psychology/ 
Faculty/ Kassin/ files/White%20Paper%20-%20LHB%20(2010).pdf [https://perma.cc/V89
T-G6VM] [hereinafter   Police-Induced  Confessions  White  Paper]. 
 34 Id. 
 35 See, e.g., Leo, supra note 27; Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33. 
 36 See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT 
WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991). 
 37 ROGER FISHER & DANIEL SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASON: USING EMOTIONS AS YOU 
NEGOTIATE (2005). 
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the position-based, interest-based, and core concerns negotiation models 
and applies each model to the interrogation of Nga Truong to show how 
police can exploit elements from these negotiation models to coerce 
interrogation subjects to confess.  Part IV then reflects on the insights 
gained from examining police interrogations under the negotiation model 
framework and proposes potential solutions to the problem of 
psychologically coercive interrogation practices. 
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF INTERROGATIONS 
A. HISTORICAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF COERCION 
Officials have engaged in widespread torture as a means of eliciting 
confessions throughout history. Centuries ago in the Roman Republic, 
officials regularly used physical torture on slaves to extract confessions and 
augment testimony.38 In the later period of the Roman Empire, officials 
expanded confessional torture policies to citizens as well as slaves, and 
used these techniques to confirm evidence in cases involving those accused 
of “grave crimes.”39 Similarly in the U.S., for much of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, “the state had ample means to obtain incriminatory 
evidence,” and sheriffs, constables, night watchmen, and community 
members were responsible for crime control.40 However, large-scale 
professional police departments developed in the late nineteenth century 
and took on responsibility for criminal investigations and interrogations.41 
The lack of law governing interrogations allowed officers to engage in 
“third degree” methods of physical and mental torture similar to ancient 
Roman techniques.42 Commonly employed third-degree techniques against 
interrogation subjects included: beating, kicking, mauling, holding a 
suspect’s head under water, burning with cigars or pokers, extended solitary 
confinement, sleep and food deprivation, shining blinding lights in faces, 
 
 38 Tracey Maclin, A Comprehensive Analysis of the History of Interrogation Law, With 
Some Shots Directed at Miranda v. Arizona, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1387, 1397–98 (2015). 
 39 Sarah Bond, Torture Has Never Been An Effective Means of Information Gathering – 
Just Ask the Romans, FORBES (Jan. 28, 2017, 8:58 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/drsarahbond/2017/01/28/torture-has-never-been-an-effective-means-of-information-
gathering-just-ask-the-romans/#1274fe89367c [https://perma.cc/RSD9-8JZW]. 
 40 Steven Penney, Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View, 25 AM. J. 
CRIM. L 309, 322–23 (1998). 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id.; Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 6. 
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coercive questioning, threats, and promises related to leniency.43  Police 
interrogators relied on these types of tactics through the 1930s.44  In 1929, 
President Herbert Hoover established the Wickersham Commission (also 
known as the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement), 
a committee which investigated and analyzed issues in law enforcement.45  
In its 1931 report, the Commission condemned interrogators’ use of third-
degree methods and found that they led to coerced false confessions.46 
Shortly after the Wickersham Commission’s 1931 report, the Supreme 
Court, in 1936, condemned interrogators’ use of physical abuse to elicit 
confessions in Brown v. Mississippi.47  In Brown, police arrested a suspect, 
hung him by a rope from a tree limb, and later tied him to the tree, where 
they whipped him while he proclaimed his innocence.48  Police eventually 
released the man, but rearrested him days later, severely whipped him 
again, and told him the whipping would continue until he confessed.49  The 
suspect did confess and he was convicted based on this confession, but the 
Supreme Court reversed his conviction, stating that a trial “is a mere 
pretense where the state authorities have contrived a conviction resting 
solely upon confessions obtained by violence.”50  The Court further held 
that in order to comport with due process, state action must be “consistent 
with fundamental principles of liberty and justice”.51 
As a result of the Wickersham Commission’s report and the Supreme 
Court holding in Brown that “[t]he rack and torture chamber may not be 
substituted for the witness stand,”52 interrogators began to move away from 
 
 43 Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 6; Maclin, supra note 38, 
at 1391; Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-
DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 909 (2004). 
 44 Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 6. 
 45 Maclin, supra note 38, at 1391; John Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Herbert Hoover: 
Remarks at the First Meeting of the National Commission on Law Observance and 
Enforcement, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/210035 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2017) [https://perma.cc/CNV2-Z38H]. 
 46 Id. 
 47 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 12. 
 48 297 U.S. at 281. 
 49 Id. at 281–82. 
 50 Id. at 284, 286. 
 51 Id. at 286 (quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)); Russell L. 
Weaver, Reliability, Justice, and Confessions: The Essential Paradox, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
179, 182–83 (2010). 
 52 297 U.S. at 286; see also Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (holding that 
admission of a confession was improper because it was elicited by means of a brutal 
interrogation). 
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third-degree tactics.53  Instead, interrogators increasingly developed and 
relied on psychological interrogation methods to increase subjects’ anxiety 
and stress and exploit their emotions.54  Police interrogators have developed 
a “single-minded purpose of interrogation . . . to elicit incriminating 
statements” because confession evidence can lead to convictions,55 and 
police performance is often measured by the number of convictions they 
obtain, and subsequently the number of crimes they clear.56 These 
performance measures do not necessarily consider whether guilty or 
innocent people are convicted.57  Consequently, interrogators have relied on 
these psychological interrogation methods to obtain confessions from 
suspects by any means necessary. 
Current federal and state laws allow—or at least fail to explicitly 
prohibit—interrogators to employ psychologically coercive tactics that lead 
innocent people to falsely confess to crimes.  The American criminal justice 
system has grappled with police-induced false confessions since the late 
nineteenth century.58  An 1819 case that is widely regarded as the first 
wrongful conviction case in the United States involved a false confession.59  
In 1897, the Supreme Court ruled in Bram v. United States that under the 
Fifth Amendment, any confession “extracted by any sort of threats or 
violence . . . obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, 
[or] by the exertion of any improper influence” is invalid.60  However, the 
Court did not deem the Fifth Amendment “privilege against compelled self-
incrimination” to be a “fundamental” right, and it was thus only applicable 
to federal criminal trials and not state criminal trials, which constitute the 
vast majority of criminal trials.61  The Supreme Court did not extend (via 
the Fourteenth Amendment) this privilege to the states until Malloy v. 
 
 53 Drizin & Leo, supra note 43, at 909–10. 
 54 Id.; Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 6. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Roger Koppl & Meghan Sacks, The Criminal Justice System Creates Incentives for 
False Convictions, 32 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 126, 145 (2013), https://doi.org/ 
10.1080/0731129X.2013.817070 [https://perma.cc/R8SB-76T8]. 
 57 Id. at 146. 
 58 Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 6. 
 59 Robert J. Norris & Allison D. Redlich, Seeking Justice, Compromising Truth? 
Criminal Admissions and the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 77 ALB. L. REV. 1005, 1015–16 (2014) 
(noting the incident of the first wrongful conviction in the U.S. in 1819). 
 60 168 U.S. 532, 542–43 (1897). 
 61 Id. at 542; Marc L. Waite, Reining in “Knock and Talk” Investigations: Using 
Missouri v. Seibert to Curtail an End-Run Around the Fourth Amendment, 41 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 1335, 1354 (2007). 
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Hogan in 1964.62   This meant that for decades, suspects in state criminal 
trials could not invoke the Fifth Amendment protection to exclude coerced 
confessions.63 
B. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR MODERN INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES 
Unlike the explicit prohibition of physical torture in interrogations in 
Brown, the law regarding psychologically coercive and deceptive 
interrogation practices is “far less condemnatory,” providing broad leeway 
to police in the interrogation room.64  Prior to the Supreme Court’s 
substantive discussion of the Fifth Amendment’s application to 
interrogations and psychological techniques applied in police questioning in 
Miranda v. Arizona,65 the Court noted in several cases that interrogators 
engaging in deceptive tactics can cause involuntary confessions.66  For 
example, Leyra v. Denno involved a psychiatrist, who, working with police, 
impersonated a general medical practitioner and posed “subtle and 
suggestive questions . . . to induce [the] petitioner to admit his guilt.”67  The 
Supreme Court deemed the resulting confession involuntary because of the 
psychiatrist’s deception and the police’s use of other mentally and 
emotionally taxing tactics.68  However, the Court did not hold that coercive 
tactics of this nature on their own could presumptively disqualify a 
confession on voluntariness grounds.69  Thus, despite discussion of 
psychological interrogation practices, prior to Miranda, the Court did not 
rule on the legality of the use of coercive practices in general, and focused 
instead on the context of individual cases.  Nonetheless, interrogation 
jurisprudence further developed in the 1960s when the Supreme Court 
guaranteed suspects in state criminal proceedings the Fifth Amendment’s 
“privilege against self-incrimination” through the Fourteenth Amendment 
in Malloy,70 and the Court held that the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel 
applied during police interrogations in Escobedo v. Illinois.71 
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Scholars, including Saul M. Kassin, Steven A. Drizin, and Thomas 
Grisso, view Miranda as a significant step in the Court seeking to prevent 
police interrogations from leading to coerced, false confessions.72   
In 1966, the Miranda Court expressed concern about instances where 
“the inherently threatening power of the police” was leveraged against the 
lesser powers of interrogation subjects, and theorized that the process of 
questioning was coercive due to its power dynamic structure alone.73  Here, 
however, the Court again failed to explicitly outlaw psychologically 
coercive interrogation tactics.74  In a 5–4 decision, the Court ruled that the 
Fifth Amendment mandated a fundamental privilege for interrogation 
subjects to receive warnings about their rights to remain silent, that 
anything they do or say can and will be used against them, information 
about availability of legal counsel, and an opportunity to waive those rights 
before the interrogation.75  Further, “unless and until such warnings and 
waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as 
a result of the interrogation can be used against [the defendant].”76 
Despite the theoretical increase in protections against coerced 
confessions for interrogation subjects that Miranda offered, federal and 
state courts today largely permit coercive police interrogation conduct as 
long as police provide the Miranda warnings and the suspects waive their 
rights.77  Whether innocent or not, more than 80% of suspects waive their 
Miranda rights with the intent of seeming cooperative to police.78  
Consequently, “Miranda has not proven to be a panacea to the problem of 
false confessions.”79  Research suggests that merely satisfying the Miranda 
 
 72 See Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 7 (describing Miranda 
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 73 Id.; Maclin, supra note 38, at 1399. 
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 75 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 476, 479 (1966); see also In re Gault, 387 
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 76 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. 
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 78 Douglas Starr, Do police interrogation techniques produce false confessions?, THE 
NEW YORKER (Dec. 9, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/12/09/the-
interview-7 [https://perma.cc/T55U-SZCS]. 
 79 Weaver, supra note 51, at 184. 
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requirements is insufficient to prevent interrogators from coercing innocent 
people to falsely confess.80  Most innocent suspects relinquish their rights 
before the accusations begin in an interrogation, and are unlikely to invoke 
their rights to end the questioning as interrogators increase pressure and 
employ coercive tactics.81  Suspects give up their rights in some instances 
because police administer the warning poorly or improperly, and in doing 
so, “undercu[t] its significance and impact.”82  In addition, significant issues 
remain even if the Miranda rights are properly extended.83  Suspects may 
be nervous, misunderstand the implications of their actions, or feel 
concerned about the consequences of talking to police, and might therefore 
waive their rights without much consideration of the consequences.84  
While these are potential issues for all interrogation subjects, according to 
Christopher Slobogin, “psychological characteristics of [some] supect[s] 
make the warnings irrelevant.”85  In particular, adults with mental 
disabilities and children under the age of sixteen tend to misunderstand the 
warnings or their implications.86 
Since Miranda, the Supreme Court has been more deferential toward 
police departments’ interrogation practices, and has permitted, through 
explicit rulings as well as vague interpretations and statements about the 
law, the continued use of deceptive and coercive tactics.87  Presently, police 
can “lie about anything in the interrogation room so long as it does not 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment due process voluntariness standard.”88  
For instance, in Frazier v. Cupp, interrogators falsely told the suspect that a 
person he was with at the time of the crime had confessed to it.89  The Court 
held that while deceptive tactics of this nature should be considered when 
assessing the voluntariness of a confession, they were insufficient on their 
own “to make this otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible.”90  This 
 
 80 See Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 7–9. 
 81 Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice 
and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979, 1116–17 (1997). 
 82 Weaver, supra note 51, at 185. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
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case “has been interpreted by police and the courts as a green light to 
deception.”91 
Additionally, in the context of an interrogation, it is legal for the police 
to “misrepresen[t] the strength of the state’s case to the suspect.”92  Police 
are further permitted to deceptively befriend suspects in an effort to gain 
their trust and get information from them.93  According to case law, police 
are not explicitly prohibited from engaging in minimization, or 
“downplaying the moral consequences of the crime without mentioning the 
legal ones.”94  Minimization, part of the commonly-used Reid Technique, 
involves interrogators expressing sympathy to the suspect, minimizing the 
offense, suggesting that they would act in a similar way, and offering 
various explanations for the crime.95  For example, in a murder 
interrogation, police using minimization tactics might suggest to the suspect 
“that the murder was spontaneous, provoked, peer-pressured, or accidental 
rather than the work of a cold-blooded premeditated killer.”96  Minimization 
is intended to provide interrogation subjects with moral justifications and 
excuses for the alleged crime, and when a person is under extreme pressure 
and experiencing feelings of desperation and hopelessness, he or she may 
consequently feel that confessing is a tenable alternative or escape.97 
In the last few decades, the Supreme Court has also issued rulings that 
changed some procedures surrounding interrogation jurisprudence.  In 
1991, the Court held in Arizona v. Fulminante that the admission of an 
involuntary confession was subject to harmless error analysis, rather than 
“trigger[ing] a rule of ‘automatic reversal.’”98  This means that in cases 
where a coerced confession was allowed into evidence, instead of the case 
being automatically reversed, the appellate court will consider the 
admittance of the confession as “harmless error” and look beyond the 
 
they had compromising DNA evidence and satellite images of the suspect’s car at the crime 
scene did not make the confession inadmissible). 
 91 Police-Induced Confessions White Paper, supra note 33, at 13. 
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procedural error to determine if it affected how jurors evaluated the case.99  
If the court determines that the error did not prejudice jurors’ evaluation of 
the case, then it will not reverse the case based on the error.100  Another 
shift in the law came in 2000 with the Court’s decision in Dickerson v. 
United States.101  The Dickerson Court changed the approach of examining 
the reliability of confessions to “a deferential voluntariness test examining 
the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of a confession.”102  This new test 
involves an examination of “the characteristics of the accused and the 
details of the interrogation,”103 and almost always results in courts finding 
confessions to be voluntary.104 
C. LEGAL LIMITS ON MODERN INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES 
Regardless of the interrogation legal framework’s vagueness and the 
subsequent broad authority granted to police interrogators, lower courts 
have defined some limits to this power and set some guidelines for what is 
improperly coercive. Several state courts, primarily out of fear that such 
evidence will be presented in court, ruled that police cannot fabricate 
evidence.105  However, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have 
yet to provide substantive guidance on this issue.106 Further, courts 
generally do not approve of police interrogators’ misrepresentation of legal 
rights,107 and relatedly, interrogation techniques cannot involve negotiating 
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or promising legal relief to suspects.108  Police are additionally forbidden 
from making threats of “physical force or other serious harm” against an 
interrogation subject’s family.109 
D. PRACTICES THAT FURTHER THE MODERN INTERROGATION LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK 
Outside of the legal framework, other systemic practices perpetuate 
improperly coercive interrogation tactics.  Namely, police interrogators who 
employ improper coercive tactics largely go unpunished and are rarely held 
accountable for their misconduct.110  In fact, officers are sometimes 
rewarded in these cases.  For example, Chicago police officer Francis 
Valadez has been accused of coercing six false murder confessions—
including some by men who have either been exonerated, acquitted, or had 
their charges dropped; Valadez was also accused of battery and assault 
during his time with the Chicago Police Department.111  Valadez has been 
promoted multiple times since these incidents and has received 131 awards 
during his time on the force.112  Additionally, numerous officers involved in 
the Burge Police Torture Scandal in Chicago in the 1970s through 1990s 
were “promoted, commended, or allowed to retire with full benefits,” and 
recommendations for discipline for several officers were dismissed.113  
Deborah Jacobs, a law enforcement expert and former Executive Director 
of the New Jersey American Civil Liberties Union, commented on this 
systemic issue that, “[w]hen officers see other officers’ misconduct 
tolerated—or even rewarded—it not only sends a message that brutal 
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misconduct is allowed, but that it’s the only way to succeed or survive 
within the department’s culture.”114 
II. COERCIVE PRACTICES AND CONFESSIONS 
A.  DEFINITION OF FALSE CONFESSIONS 
A false confession is defined as an admission of guilt followed by a 
factual description of a crime that the individual confessing did not actually 
commit.115  The factual descriptions often include specific details about 
how and why the confessor allegedly committed the crime.116  The state of 
Illinois and other organizations do not keep records of these types of 
confessions, so they can be challenging to discover and track.117  However, 
a number of factors may lead a court to classify a confession as false, 
including: (1) evidence that the crime did not occur, (2) evidence 
demonstrating that it was a physical impossibility for the false confessor to 
have committed the crime, (3) the person who actually committed the crime 
coming forward, or (4) DNA results or other scientific evidence proving the 
confessor’s innocence.118  Scholars explain that the psychologically 
coercive tactics that police employ involve deception and manipulation of a 
suspect’s perception of the situation and their future expectations, which 
shift the interrogation subjects’ motivations from denial to admission, and 
can ultimately produce false confessions.119  Since around 80% of criminal 
cases involve a confession,120 the issues of psychologically coercive tactics 
and false confessions highly impact the criminal justice system’s search for 
truth and administration of justice. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF CONFESSION EVIDENCE 
It is difficult for most people, particularly those unfamiliar with 
coercive interrogation methods, to imagine confessing to a crime that they 
did not commit.121  In his 1923 evidence treatise, John Henry Wigmore 
stated, “false confessions were ‘scarcely conceivable’ and ‘of the rarest 
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occurrence’, and that ‘[n]o trustworthy figures of authenticated instances 
exist.’”122  The scientific and psychological research and publications 
regarding the potential effects of police interrogations, false confessions, 
and coercive practices are not common knowledge.123  Further, most people 
have difficulty comprehending why a person would act counterintuitively to 
his or her self-interest by confessing to something that he or she did not 
do.124  Even some people who are familiar with coercive police 
interrogation tactics think that interrogators need to employ these methods 
to obtain valid confessions and that the tactics are unlikely to lead to false 
statements.125  Thus, in general, people conclude that confessions obtained 
by police interrogators are valid admissions of guilt.126  The public fails to 
recognize the scope and significance of coerced confessions, which can 
lead jurors to assign confession evidence a disproportionate amount of 
weight.127  Experiments with mock jurors have demonstrated that people 
view confession evidence as more important than other types of evidence, 
even when told that that evidence was coerced, that other evidence 
contradicts it, or that it should be disregarded.128  Thus, regardless of what 
evidence and testimony may emerge during a trial, if an individual 
confessed (falsely or not) to a crime, such a confession can seal a 
defendant’s fate in the minds of jurors. 
Not only does confession evidence significantly affect jurors’ 
perceptions of innocence, but it also persuades police, prosecutors, and 
judges.129  According to scholars Richard J. Ofshe and Richard Leo, “[a] 
confession—whether true or false—is arguably the most damaging 
evidence the government can present in a trial.”130  Following a confession, 
police usually arrest the confessor, curtail their investigation, and 
subsequently close the case.131  This happens regardless of whether 
interrogators employed questionable coercive tactics, there are 
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inconsistencies in statements, or contradictory evidence exists.132  This 
prompts a series of further issues for confessors, such as difficulties 
convincing others of their innocence in recantations post-confession, the 
increased likelihood that prosecutors will charge them severely, and greater 
difficulty making bail.133  Further, confessions can negatively influence the 
perspectives of witnesses and experts,134 corrupt the framing of other 
evidence,135 and “set in motion a virtually irrefutable presumption of guilt 
among . . . the media, the public, and lay jurors.”136 
C.  THE REID TECHNIQUE137 
Many U.S. police departments base their interrogation practices on the 
Reid Technique.138  John E. Reid, a Chicago policeman turned consultant 
and polygraph expert, and Fred Inbau, a Northwestern Law professor, 
studied polygraphs and psychology to develop the Reid Technique in the 
1940s and published the first explanatory manual in 1962.139  The technique 
unfolds in several parts that shift between interrogators offering their 
subject positive and negative incentives.140  The first step of the technique, 
sometimes referred to as the behavior analysis interview, involves probing 
the suspect, who is usually isolated in a small room,141 with basic, non-
threatening questions to watch for any indications of anxiety.142  If the 
interrogator feels that the suspect’s body language and answers indicate he 
or she is lying, the questioner begins the interrogation phase of the 
technique.143  This step largely entails the maximization tactics of insisting 
(usually with false or valid claims to evidence) that the subject committed 
the crime, preventing the suspect from denying accusations, and following 
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up with minimization that intends to make the crime seem less serious and 
occasionally with promises or inducements.144  Maximization techniques 
are intended to make a suspect feel hopeless, and the minimization tactics 
that follow are supposed to provide the suspect with a moral justification, 
making him or her feel that confessing will provide an escape or 
leniency.145  Throughout the interrogation, police will also present a theme 
to the suspect that theorizes why he or she committed the crime.146  The 
theme incorporates a suspect’s background and offers “a moral . . . excuse 
for committing the offense.”147  For example, a theme for a suspect who has 
told police that he would rob someone at gunpoint when desperate could be 
that the suspect committed the crime because of extreme financial 
necessity.148  If these steps lead an interrogation subject to confess, the 
interrogator then works in conjunction with the subject to ensure that the 
admission turns into a written confession, and can provide the subject with 
assistance like multiple choice questions to help establish the details.149 
Social scientists and legal researchers have found numerous problems 
with the Reid Technique.  At the outset, studies show that the average 
person can detect deception in non-verbal behavioral cues only 54% of the 
time, and police perform only marginally better.150  Thus, police 
interrogators often proceed in an interrogation with a false presumption of 
guilt that can lead the interrogator to treat the suspect aggressively, in turn 
increasing the suspect’s anxiety.151  The first reading of a suspect and 
interrogators’ initial presumption of guilt allow and encourage the 
interrogators to proceed with psychologically coercive tactics that can lead 
to false confessions.152 
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When interrogation subjects are innocent, their innocence becomes an 
additional risk factor that police can undermine with psychologically 
coercive tactics.  Innocent people tend to be more willing to cooperate 
because they believe that truth and justice will ultimately prevail, and that 
their innocence will become apparent to investigators and the jury.153  
Further risk factors include intellectual disability, mental illness, 
immaturity, youth, failure to understand the legal system, and failure to 
understand the potential ramifications of the situation.154  The 
psychologically coercive tactics associated with the Reid Technique can 
make individuals in these particular groups, as well as any interrogation 
subjects who become anxious and broken down by such tactics, feel 
powerless, confused, and sometimes doubtful, about their own 
innocence.155  Consequently, the Reid Technique may lead to coerced and 
false confessions. 
III. NEGOTIATION MODELS 
Police officers use elements from commonly used negotiation models 
when interrogating suspects.  These negotiation models provide varied 
tactics for addressing conflict and strive to maximize success in legal and 
business settings as well as in everyday life.  Three of the most commonly 
used models are the position-based model, the interest-based model, and the 
core concerns model.  These models can, and often do, overlap within the 
context of a singular negotiation.156  In particular, negotiation scholars 
frequently discuss the tension between position-based and interest-based 
models, commonly known as the negotiator’s dilemma.157  The dilemma 
results from the tension between the cooperative, interest-based negotiation 
approach that can build value for all parties and the adversarial, positional 
approach that can allow one party to claim value over the other.158  When 
faced with this tension, those involved in a negotiation or conflict scenario 
must remain cognizant of the tension and assess which elements of a 
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particular model are appropriate given the circumstances.159  While each 
model offers a unique framework that can help negotiators reach an 
understanding of conflict scenarios, such scenarios are often complicated 
and involve a plethora of moving parts that rarely perfectly fit or are 
explained in totality by a theoretical model.  Although these three models 
can be used to achieve positive outcomes, such as favorable deals and 
conflict resolution, police interrogators using tactics such as the Reid 
Technique employ elements from each model to coerce interrogation 
subjects to confess.  An analysis of each model aids in understanding why 
psychologically coercive interrogation techniques are so effective in 
eliciting confessions, whether true or false. 
The position-based model is an adversarial model that emphasizes 
what an individual desires, or at least what he or she says that he or she 
desires, or what he or she feels entitled to.160  The chief concern of a 
negotiator adhering to this model is gaining more value, as defined by the 
context of the negotiation, than the other party and can involve exploitation 
of one party’s power over the other to achieve that goal.161 
On the other hand, the interest-based model of negotiation focuses on 
what the negotiator actually needs and stresses the importance of the goals 
or motives that underlie the positions, or stated desires, of each party.162  As 
an example from everyday life, two chefs working in a kitchen may both 
demand that they need the last orange for a recipe, and their respective 
positions would be to claim sole use over the orange.163  However, one chef 
might need the orange peel for a garnish, and the other chef might need the 
juice of the orange for a dressing.  Those reasons would be their interests, 
or motivations for demanding the orange in the first place.164  In an interest-
based negotiation, the chefs would express this reasoning to each other in 
order to reach the mutually beneficial solution of splitting the orange, so the 
first chef claims the orange peel and the other chef takes the remainder of 
the orange.165  The four tenets of the interest-based model, which seeks to 
reach an agreement that respects the interests of both parties, are: (1) 
“separat[ing] the people from the problem” and “be[ing] soft on the people 
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and hard on the problem,” (2) “focus[ing] on interests, not positions,” (3) 
“invent[ing] options for mutual gain,” and (4) “insist[ing] on objective 
criteria.”166 
Last, Fisher and Shapiro developed and discussed the core concerns 
model of negotiation in their book Beyond Reason.167  This model 
recognizes that an overabundance of emotions is present in a negotiation 
and that emotion aids in the parties’ understanding of the situation, while 
also providing opportunities for negotiators to address and successfully 
navigate conflict scenarios.168  The model identifies five core concerns: 
appreciation, autonomy, affiliation, status, and role.169  The level of 
importance of a particular concern varies personally and situationally, but 
in general, people experience positive emotions if their concerns are met or 
have negative feelings if they are not satisfied.170  In turn, people feel 
positive emotions when engaging in interest-based negotiation and negative 
emotions tend to be linked to the adversarial position-based model.171  
Thus, core concerns can also influence parties’ positions and interests.172  In 
order to foster positive emotions, Fisher and Shapiro suggest to “‘express 
appreciation’, ‘build affiliation’, ‘respect autonomy’, acknowledge status’, 
and ‘choose a fulfilling role.’”173 
IV. APPLICATION OF NEGOTIATION MODELS TO THE CASE OF 
NGA TRUONG 
The specific details of Nga Truong’s interrogation are positioned for 
an analysis under negotiation frameworks.  The position-based model, 
interest-based model, and core-concerns model demonstrate how the 
detectives, using the Reid Technique, psychologically coerced Truong to 
confess to a crime she did not commit.  This section additionally highlights 
how Detectives Pageau and Doherty could exploit ambiguity in the legal 
framework surrounding interrogations to achieve their single-minded goal 
of obtaining confession evidence.  Further, this application suggests why 
Truong confessed despite her innocence. 
 
 166 FISHER, URY & PATTON, supra note 36, at 11–12. 
 167 FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 37. 
 168 Riskin, supra note 156, at 35–36. See also FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 37. 
 169 FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 37, at 15. 
 170 Id. at 17–21. 
 171 Riskin, supra note 156, at 36. 
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 173 Id. at 38 (quoting FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 37, at 25, 52, 72, 94, 115). 
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A. SPECIFICS OF THE TRUONG INTERROGATION 
In their interrogation of Nga Truong, Detectives Pageau and Doherty 
generally adhered to the Reid Technique.174  At the outset, Pageau and 
Doherty isolated the teenager in a small, windowless room.175  Consistently 
throughout the two-hour interrogation, rather than questioning Truong 
about Khyle’s death, they assumed that the teenage mother had killed her 
baby.176  This presumption was not based on any physical evidence. The 
interrogators failed to consider baby Khyle’s history of asthma, his fever, 
strep throat, and tracheobronchitis that his death certificate listed as 
contributing factors to his death.177  Pageau and Doherty proceeded under 
this assumption of guilt,  accused Truong of lying any time she suggested 
otherwise, and incorporated their assumption into their theme that she had a 
history of killing babies.178  The interrogators engaged in maximization 
tactics by twisting the evidence regarding the death of Truong’s brother due 
to Sudden Infant Death Syndrome eight years prior to suggest that she had 
killed him.  Detectives Pageau and Doherty then presented false evidence 
that the autopsy stated Khyle was smothered, and yelled at the teen and 
accused her of failing to tell the truth when she repeatedly stated that she 
did not kill her son.179  When Detectives Pageau and Doherty sensed that 
Truong was showing signs of hopelessness, they switched to minimization 
practices.180  The interrogators knew that Truong was poor, and lived with 
and took care of her brothers, and they offered to provide the family with 
help in getting into a better home in exchange for her confession.181  The 
police additionally advanced the theory that the teen’s mother was also 
 
 174 Gavett, supra note 4. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Boeri, supra note 2. 
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 178 Boeri, supra note 9; see also Boeri, supra note 2 (Truong: “I’m telling you 
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the world.”). 
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blameworthy in the baby’s death182 and suggested that if she confessed, she 
would be punished in juvenile court, if at all.183  Shortly thereafter, Truong 
admitted and eventually confessed to the crime.184 
Similar to many police interrogators who employ coercive tactics,185 
Detectives Pageau and Doherty largely remained within the bounds of the 
law during their questioning of Truong.  It was legal for the interrogators to 
question the teenage mother in a small space, yell at her, distort  past 
evidence about her brother’s death, and lie about Khyle’s autopsy.  The 
detectives only broke the law when they promised Truong leniency in 
juvenile court in exchange for her confession and failed to extend her the 
Miranda rights required for juveniles.186  This interrogation provides an 
opportunity to apply the position-based, interest-based, and core concerns 
models of negotiation to a coercive police interrogation that led to a false 
confession. 
B. NEGOTIATION MODELS APPLIED TO THE INTERROGATORS 
Before Truong’s interrogation began, the Worcester police lacked any 
evidence against the teen.187  Given that the case involved the death of a 
baby, Detectives Pageau and Doherty likely felt significant pressure to 
obtain the valuable evidence of a confession.188  While police interrogators 
often do not maliciously intend to elicit false confessions or convict people 
for crimes that they did not commit,189 interrogators’ “single-minded 
purpose” in an interrogation is to obtain evidence, preferably in the form of 
a confession, that will lead to a conviction.190  Thus, under the position-
based model, police will use coercive tactics and exploit their inherent 
power over suspects to meet their position of securing a confession.191 
 
 182 Gavett, supra note 4 (Pageau and Doherty implied that the teenage mother committed 
the murder because taking care of her siblings had become frustrating and too much of a 
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A possible interest for detectives like Pageau and Doherty is the desire 
to feel that they are of value to their departments by gaining this evidence. 
Detectives are often encouraged by departments that reward effective 
interrogators with awards and promotions.192  These interests underlie and 
motivate interrogators’ position of securing confession evidence. 
Last, the core concerns that appear to be most significant to police 
interrogators like Pageau and Doherty are appreciation, status, and role.193 
If officers successfully obtain confessions, police superiors, the media, and 
the public may all express appreciation to the officers and recognize their 
status as effective interrogators.194  These officers will then feel fulfilled in 
their role in the police department by getting a conviction for a suspect.  
This examination under the negotiation models demonstrates that the 
single-minded position of obtaining a confession—particularly in high 
stakes cases where evidence is lacking—combined with the interests and 
core concerns that encourage police to achieve this position can lead 
interrogators to employ any means necessary to secure confessions.  In turn, 
this can result in the proliferation of coercive tactics that lead to false 
confessions and can detract from determining the truth and a commitment 
to justice. 
C. NEGOTIATION MODELS APPLIED TO NGA TRUONG 
On the other side of the interrogation, Truong presented several of the 
risk factors mentioned in Part II.195  Her age, lack of exposure and 
understanding of the legal system and interrogation practices, and 
emotional state due to her son’s death one day earlier, coupled with the 
deceptive tactics of the interrogators, made her more susceptible to the 
coercion that ultimately resulted in a confession of guilt for her son’s 
death.196  An examination of the interrogation under the negotiation model 
framework from Truong’s perspective further illustrates why the teenage 
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mother gave into the coercion and confessed.  The position of Truong and 
others in similar interrogation situations is to retain their innocence and 
avoid being convicted of the crime alleged against them.197  However, as 
the interrogation progresses and police employ techniques that exploit 
interrogation subjects’ interests, it can become difficult for subjects to keep 
this ultimate goal in mind, and subjects can become tempted to give in to 
their interests that offer any form of escape.198  In this case, the 
interrogators’ coercive tactics exploited Truong’s interest in helping her 
family and getting out of the hopeless interrogation situation. 
Further, applying the framework of core concerns, Pageau and 
Doherty built affiliation with the teen by showing sympathy for her 
situation through their minimization practices and recognition of her status 
as the caretaker for her brothers.199  This, in turn, likely made Truong feel 
appreciated for caring for her family.  Under the frameworks of the 
negotiation models, this demonstrates that interrogators can leverage their 
power and utilize coercive tactics to exploit suspects’ interests and core 
concerns to alter their positions, leading to a result that is in line with the 
interrogators’ positions, interests, and core concerns. 
CONCLUSION 
A. AFTERMATH OF NGA TRUONG’S CASE 
In 2016, the City of Worcester reached a settlement with Nga Truong 
for $2.1 million in the aftermath of the false confession.200  Following her 
release from jail, Truong enrolled in college and is now living as a free 
woman.201  However, after the case ended, the policemen responsible for 
her interrogation “continue[d] to perform their duties as investigators with 
the full support and confidence of the police administration.”202  The 
Worcester Police Department actually promoted Pageau to investigate 
police misconduct.203  Worcester Police Chief Gary Gemme further 
confirmed that he “expressed full support and confidence in [his] two 
officers.”204 The police department’s only other institutional response was 
to agree that the district attorney would be involved in all of its 
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investigations of homicides and serious crimes.205  Ed Ryan, Truong’s 
lawyer in the case and former Massachusetts Bar Association president, 
commented on the lack of police accountability and tolerance for the 
continuance of coercive interrogation tactics.  He explained that “[t]his is a 
degree of arrogance, a degree of disrespect for the rule of law that frightens 
me . . . That is a very frightening circumstance to have law enforcement so 
empowered, so arrogant, that they think they can get away with this kind of 
behavior.”206  Ryan further stated that Truong’s case was “the worst case of 
coercion he’s seen in thirty-five years.”207 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CROSS-INSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
Psychologically coercive tactics like those used by the police 
interrogators in Truong’s case can and do elicit truthful confessions that 
lead to the proper administration of justice, but they also frequently elicit 
false confessions.208  Given the significant weight that the public, as well as 
those in the legal field, assign to confession evidence, these confessions can 
create injustices throughout the legal process and lead to convictions and 
jail time for innocent people.  Further, false confessions and wrongful 
convictions mean that the true perpetrators of crimes may remain free with 
the potential to commit further harm. 
False confessions also place a financial toll on taxpayers.209  In the 
past few years, judges in cities across the country have awarded settlements 
ranging from a few million dollars to tens of millions of dollars to 
individuals like Truong who were coerced into falsely confessing.210  
Settlements related to false confessions significantly contribute to bills 
totaling hundreds of millions of dollars that cities are paying for police 
misconduct.211  For example, the state of Illinois paid about $253 million in 
taxpayer-backed settlements in wrongful conviction cases between 1989 
and early 2013, many of which involved false confessions.212  Taxpayers 
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are consequently forced to pay the price for police interrogators’ use of 
psychologically coercive tactics, while the interrogators themselves largely 
remain unpunished. 
To address the issue of unreliable confessions as well as the issue of 
financial drain that stems from the larger issue and is illustrated by 
Truong’s case, lawmakers and judges, as well as police departments and 
individual officers, must commit to systemic changes.  Lawmakers can 
adopt legislation, like the laws some states have adopted that require police 
to electronically record interrogations.213  Legislation of this nature will set 
standards for other elements of interrogations, such as presentation of 
evidence, offers to provide help, and psychological manipulation and 
coercion in general.  Further, when presented with evidence of confessions 
elicited via coercive tactics, courts can take the opportunity, much like the 
Court did when it related to physical torture tactics in Brown,214 to 
explicitly prohibit evidence elicited from psychologically coercive 
interrogation tactics.  Finally, police departments can update their 
interrogation procedures and implement and enforce policies that hold 
officers accountable when they engage in coercive practices.  This cross-
institutional approach to reform will help to decrease the number of coerced 
and false confessions, and in turn, will aid in the administration of true 
justice. 
While the United States’ interrogation jurisprudence made a step in the 
right direction by outlawing third-degree tactics,215 and lawmakers have 
furthered progress by introducing electronic recording requirements for 
interrogations in some states,216 there exists significant room for 
improvement when it comes to psychologically coercive techniques.  The 
laws currently in place, in addition to police departments’ failure to hold 
officers accountable for engagement in improper, and sometimes illegal, 
interrogation tactics, encourages the perpetuation of coerced, false 
confessions.  Under the Reid Technique, police interrogators are trained to 
employ psychologically coercive tactics and police departments often 
reward officers for securing confessions, whether psychologically coerced 
or not.  Research demonstrates that these tactics are just as coercive as the 
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physical torture associated with the third-degree methods.  The law should 
thus be updated to reflect that.  Like electronic recording laws, legislators 
can continue to address this issue by developing laws that regulate other 
aspects of interrogations, such as the type and size of room where the 
questioning takes place, the kinds of questions that interrogators can and 
cannot ask, and the evidence (whether real or fake) that officers can 
introduce. 
Courts that hear cases involving false confessions can begin to 
establish precedent prohibiting psychologically coercive interrogation 
methods, such as the Reid Technique.  Similar to Judge Kenton-Walker’s 
approach in Truong’s case, judges can take into consideration the coercive 
influence of some of the legally ambiguous interrogation tactics and deem 
confessions inadmissible when the tactics have an unjust coercive impact 
on a subject.  Prosecutors can further explicitly prohibit interrogators’ use 
of any tactics that violate existing laws and can increase enforcement in this 
realm.  Additionally, as mentioned in the Introduction, courts in recent 
years have begun to award individuals coerced into confessing millions of 
dollars in settlements with cities and police departments.217  If the judicial 
system continues with this practice, this will provide further incentive for 
police departments to adopt policies and practices that promote the proper 
administration of justice, rather than those that encourage tactics that are 
psychologically coercive to obtain confessions at any cost. 
The current police systems that tolerate and encourage such practices 
via awards and promotions should be overhauled.  Analysis of 
psychologically coercive interrogation practices under the frameworks of 
the position-based, interest-based, and core concerns models of negotiation 
illustrates how these tactics can coerce individuals into confessing to 
crimes. Interrogators exploit suspects’ positions, interests, and core 
concerns with a single-minded focus of obtaining confessions to enhance 
the interrogators’ own positions, interests, and core concerns.  This 
examination further demonstrates that police interrogators’ hyper-focus on 
obtaining confessions impedes the search for truth and justice in numerous 
instances by eliciting false confessions.  While it is important to gather 
solid, reliable evidence in cases, the positions of interrogators should shift 
to focus on the proper administration of justice.  States and localities are 
also financially incentivized to encourage police departments to change 
their focus and update their policies given the massive settlements and 
damages payments that courts are issuing to individuals that interrogators 
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are coercing.218  Departments should reform their interrogation practices 
with these positions as a guide, rather than continue with methods found to 
be psychologically coercive and unjust.  Current policies fail to deter police 
interrogators from using psychologically coercive tactics, and there should 
be more repercussions when police elicit false confessions.  Departments 
should thus additionally replace any practices that offer incentives to 
officers involved in interrogations that judges deem to be psychologically 
coerced with measures that punish and hold officers accountable for such 
conduct.  Following the negotiation model framework, this policy and 
practice update will also aid in shifting police interrogators’ interests and 
core concerns to ultimately encourage the position of striving for the proper 
administration of justice. 
The cross-institutional systemic reform outlined above, informed by 
insights from common negotiation models, can help to address the issue of 
psychologically coercive interrogation tactics, which are largely permitted 
by the current legal framework surrounding interrogations and are 
encouraged by police departments.  These tactics employ psychological 
manipulation and deceit to coerce interrogation subjects into confessing, 
and as seen in the case of Nga Truong, can lead individuals to confess to 
crimes that they did not commit.  Updates to interrogation legislation and 
reform of police departments’ interrogation practices will improve the 
reliability of confession evidence and will decrease the financial drain that 
false confessions impose on taxpayers.  In the end, these psychologically 
coercive tactics must be prohibited so that no interrogation subject has a 
coerced fate. 
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